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The Political Economy of Special Economic
Zones: Lessons for the United States
Lotta Moberg*
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a policy change that could spur economic
development without costing a dollar. A change that could increase
employment in selected areas of a country through the growth of
the industries of policy makers’ choices. The change in question is
the special economic zone (“SEZ”). This article explores the
benefits and downsides of SEZs, and analyzes their economic and
political impact on the United States. It argues that, though
widely implemented in the country, SEZs have likely done more
harm than good for the United States.
SEZs are areas where a government chooses to have different
rules from the rest of the country. The zones are usually designed
to attract investors in various industries with the aim to increase
exports, employment, and production. SEZs are credited with
promoting development in numerous countries, from the large-scale
zones of China to the small industry parks scattered throughout
Latin America and Asia.1 In the past few decades, several African
countries have introduced SEZ legislation, often with the hope of
emulating the rapid industrialization of the Asian “Tigers.”2

* Lotta Moberg is the author of The Political Economy of Special Economic Zones:
Concentrating Economic Development. She has published articles on targeted tax
benefits, municipal bankruptcy, and tax harmonization in addition to special economic
zones. She is part of the Dynamic Allocations Strategies Team at William Blair and
advisor at Politas Consulting. She thanks Tom W. Bell and Brian D. Singer for their
valuable comments and suggestions.
1 See, e.g., Hooshang Amirahmadi & Weiping Wu, Export Processing Zones in Asia,
35 ASIAN SURV. 828, 828–29 (1995); ANTOINE BASILE & DIMITRIOS A. GERMIDIS, INVESTING
IN FREE EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES 11 (1984); Gokhan Akinci & James Crittle, Special
Economic Zones: Performance, Lessons Learned, and Implications for Zone Development 32
(World Bank Foreign Investment Advisory Service, Working Paper No. 45869, 2008);
ROBERT C. HAYWOOD, Free Zones in the Modern World, WEPZA 3 (2000); Thomas Farole &
Gokhan Akinci, Introduction to SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES: PROGRESS, EMERGING
CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 4–5 (Thomas Farole & Gokhan Akinci eds., 2011);
Jin Wang, The Economic Impact of Special Economic Zones: Evidence from Chinese
Municipalities, 101 J. DEV. ECON. 133, 145–46 (2013). Most of these sources also note some
of the problems with the SEZ model.
2 THOMAS FAROLE, SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN AFRICA: COMPARING PERFORMANCE
AND LEARNING FROM GLOBAL EXPERIENCE 166–67 (2011).
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SEZs are not without their controversies, and as this article
argues, the United States has largely failed to implement them in
a way that promotes economic growth. The World Bank proposed
in the early 1990s that SEZs are inferior to “economywide”
reforms.3 Some zones have failed to attract investors, despite
generous incentives. Clearly, the policy does not always succeed.
SEZ success, as discussed below, is also commonly misunderstood
and can be defined in many different ways.
Most of the early SEZs, which focused on reshipping and
warehousing, were found primarily at ports and airports, and
served as spaces for tariff relief. The shipping and warehousing
industries rely on importing and exporting goods. If the government
imposes tariffs to protect its domestic industries, this clearly hurts
the import-dependent industries. In this environment, SEZs can
allow the shipping and warehousing industries to flourish. As long
as they cannot buy their wares domestically, allowing them to
import tariff-free causes no harm on the domestic producers that
enjoy tariff protection.
SEZs have been around in their modern form at least since
the 1950s. One of the first modern SEZs came about as the scope
of the free zone at the Shannon Airport in Ireland was expanded.
The airport had previously relied on air traffic in need of refueling
airplanes on their way across the Atlantic.4 The introduction of the
jet engine made this business model obsolete.5 The zone authority
therefore decided to lure production to the zone as well, thus
growing the town of Shannon and inducing air traffic for more
reasons than mere transit.6
The Shannon zone represented an early version of the export
processing zone, which is the form of SEZs that has prevailed ever
since.7 Export processing zones take the form of industrial parks,
which means that they only contain production facilities, as
opposed to also including residential areas.8 They are generally
small enough to fit within a few blocks. Governments often require
that most or all zone investor production be exported—hence the
label of the zone. Some SEZs are even smaller. So-called single
factory zones9 may host a single company and occupy one floor in
an office building.

THE WORLD BANK, EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES 1 (1992).
BRIAN CALLANAN, IRELAND’S SHANNON STORY: A CASE STUDY OF LOCAL AND
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 47 (2000).
5 Id.
6 Id. at 50.
7 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 3, at 25.
8 Id. at 24.
9 Akinci & Crittle, supra note 1, at 3.
3
4
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The variation, size, and form of SEZs—from the multimillionpeople zones of China to one-company schemes—implies that
there is no one answer to the question of whether SEZs represent
good policy. Depending on their size, regulations, and institutional
context, they will function very differently and come with very
different problems and benefits, as this article explores.
The United States introduced free zones in 1934 in response
to the Smooth-Hawley tariffs.10 This new-found protectionism
threatened the U.S. warehousing and reshipping industry, and
the zones isolated this segment of the American economy from
much of this protectionism regime. Since then, SEZs have
proliferated in the country and now amount to around 750,
including smaller zones.11
Despite their ubiquity, the U.S. zones have had little impact
on economic development in the country.12 This paper applies a
political economy analysis to SEZs and shows that the reason for
their limited influence in the United States lies both in the nature
of the zones themselves and in the institutional context in which
they are introduced. It also suggests how to make American zones
more successful, and explains what lessons can be drawn from
SEZs of the past.
The next Part explains why a political economy analysis best
assesses the costs and benefits of SEZs. Part II presents a
framework for comparing SEZs to the status quo. Part III
discusses whether SEZs are better than their political alternative.
Part IV explores how SEZs can perform at their best. The paper
concludes in Part V with a discussion of the implications for the
SEZs in the United States.
I. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH TO SEZS
Most scholarly literature on SEZs applies a misleading
perspective when assessing their success. Commonly stated goals
of SEZs include increased exports, production, and employment in

10 Matthew Grant, Why Special Economic Zones? Using Trade Policy to Discriminate
Across Importers 8–9 (Feb. 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://drive.google.com/file/
d/0B_4Z5rmKH1P5VE0yV1QxZ0JaZTg/view.
11 See Tom W. Bell, Special Economic Zones in the United States: From Colonial Charters,
to Foreign-Trade Zones, Toward USSEZs, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 959, 969–70 (2016); Grant, supra
note 10, at 7–8; Benjamin Chris Zissimos, Summary of the 4th InsTED / 9th EESP-FGV
Workshop, INSTED INSTITUTIONS TRADE & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (May 31, 2017),
http://blogs.exeter.ac.uk/insted/2017/05/31/summary-of-the-4th-insted-9th-eesp-fgv-workshop/
[http://perma.cc/XN2A-9V8X]; How many zones exist now?, U.S. FOREIGN-TRADE ZONES BOARD,
https://enforcement.trade.gov/ftzpage/info/zonestats.html [http://perma.cc/6UVD-PX7G] (last
visited Nov. 11, 2017).
12 Susan Tiefenbrun, U.S. Foreign Trade Zones, Tax-Free Trade Zones of the World,
and Their Impact on the U.S. Economy, 12 J. INT’L BUS. & L., Spring 2013, at 214.
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the area of the zone. Such outcomes are fairly easy to measure, but
are unfortunately quite unhelpful in determining whether a zone
policy is actually beneficial.13
Instead of looking only at outcomes, scholars should apply a
cost-benefit analysis to SEZs and focus as much attention to the
costs of the policy as to the benefits. To understand the impact of
SEZs, one must take a political economy perspective that looks
both at the incentives they promote and their most common
unintended consequences. The political economy perspective
reveals that the main costs of SEZs are political, rather than
economic. The most severe costs are not easy (and often impossible)
to measure with macroeconomic data. This perspective also reveals
that the main benefits of SEZs are political too, rather than the
economic outcomes for which the zones are commonly praised.
There have been attempts to perform cost-benefit analyses of
SEZs, but these are limited in scope and rely on various
quantitative approximations. Scholars have attempted to count
company profits, wages, and the like in an SEZ. These benefits are
then compared with the costs of the resources used in the zone,
which must be based on prices and wage levels in the country at
large. If, for instance, 100 zone workers earn $10 per hour, while
their wage elsewhere is $5, the zone adds $500 of benefits per hour
in wages. If the return on a piece of capital, like a machine or
natural resource, is $1 per day in the zone and eighty cents outside
the zone, the daily value created by the zone through capital use
is twenty cents per piece of capital. Because of the complication of
such estimates, this type of cost-benefit analysis can apply only to
smaller zones with simple production and no residential property.
Even then, the costs can only be approximated, and any dynamic
benefits, such as technological transfers from foreign investors to
domestic firms, must be excluded.14
A political economy analysis considers that policy makers
cannot know the ultimate outcome of a policy. The analysis also
accounts for the risk of a policy being abused by both businesses
and policy makers. Any policy, SEZs included, look good on paper
when any such political economy problems are assumed away.
When policy makers always know the exact effect of the changes
they introduce and govern with the best for society in mind, most

13 LOTTA MOBERG, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES:
CONCENTRATING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 8 (2017).
14 Peter G. Warr, Export Processing Zones: The Economics of Enclave Manufacturing,
4 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 65, 77 (1989); Kankesu Jayanthakumaran, Benefit-Cost
Appraisals of Export Processing Zones: A Survey of the Literature, 21 DEV. POL’Y REV. 51,
61–62 (2003).
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policies are beneficial. Alas, the reality is that policy-makers
inevitably have a poor understanding of the market conditions
that they seek to affect. Just like businesses, they are also
motivated by their own wellbeing. Under the wrong incentive
structures therefore, they will take advantage of their positions to
the detriment of society at large. Whether policy makers will act
as if they are informed and selfless will depend on the institutional
environment in which a policy is introduced.
Classical economic models generally assume away politicaleconomy related frictions stemming either from the ignorance or
distorted incentives of government officials. These models assume
that policy makers aim to maximize social welfare, have perfect
knowledge, and that the system is free of fraud or corruption. Alas,
reality is famously fraught with such imperfections, an insight
that a political economy analysis takes into account.
An assessment of SEZ success must also account for political
economic benefits that standard macroeconomic studies generally
overlook. Political influence can be for the better if it leads to
beneficial policy changes. If these spread beyond the SEZ, they can
catalyze beneficial change in the country as a whole.
SEZs should be deemed successful if they have long-term
beneficial impacts on the broader host economy. Focusing only on
one or a few macroeconomic variables as indicators of success is
too narrow. Yet “beneficial” can have a different meaning,
depending on the reference point. As such, SEZs may be seen as
beneficial in three different ways:
1. Compared to the status quo:
Would the country be better off without them, assuming
all else stays the same in their absence?
2. Compared to their political alternative:
Would the economy be in worse shape with the policies
that would be introduced in the absence of SEZs?
3. Compared to their best possible outcome:
Are the SEZs living up to their full potential?
The following three Parts discuss these levels of SEZ success
in turn.
II. COMPARING SEZS TO THE STATUS QUO
SEZs famously have many advantages. By attracting
investors, they increase economic activity in the designated area
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and provide employment for the local population.15 They may also
increase the demand for local products. When looking only at these
benefits, SEZs seem like a winning proposition for any economy.
Unfortunately, SEZs can also come at great costs that, in a
bad scenario, overshadow the benefits. While it is true that
market-friendly SEZ policies generally increase economic
activity in the country as a whole, the investments needed to
make this happen may come at too high a price to make the
policy worthwhile.
The most obvious cost of SEZs is government spending on zone
infrastructure.16 When planners envision an SEZ, its visible
features usually come to mind most vividly. Governments
commonly make sure that their visions are fulfilled by building the
structures and offices that they expect investors to demand.17
While that ambition is admirable, more spending on
infrastructure means that the government must either spend less
on other programs, raise taxes, or borrow money. In one way or
another, the people of the country pay the bill for the zone project.
While infrastructure costs are easily measured, SEZs also
come with several hidden costs that are harder to estimate. One
is the loss of revenue that the government incurs from granting
fiscal incentives to zone investors.18 Domestic investors contribute
more in taxes directly when located outside an SEZ. If they move
from other parts of the country into the zones without increasing
their production, the move constitutes a mere transfer of
government revenue to company profits. Alas, this seems often to
be the case for the U.S. zones. If domestic investors do expand
and employ more people as they become SEZ investors, they can
contribute to government revenue through income taxes, for
instance. To account for the full impact on government finances,
one must estimate how many more people domestic companies
employ in the zone and what that implies in terms of increased
income tax revenues.
The picture is equally as complicated for foreign SEZ
investors. It is often assumed that they would not have chosen to
come to the country in the absence of fiscal incentives.19 If this is
the case, no tax revenue is lost as it would not have been collected
without a zone either. However, that will not always be true. If
they would have invested in the country anyway, the government

15
16
17
18
19

See id. at 63.
MOBERG, supra note 13, at 8.
Id. at 9.
Id.
See id. at 2.
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is foregoing revenues by offering them tax exemptions. Yet the
government can always claim that the SEZ policy is the reason for
any investments that enter the country, since nobody can ever
prove the counterfactual.
Another hidden cost is the alternative cost of domestic
resources employed in an SEZ.20 Foreign investors may bring
some of their employees and capital with them, but they generally
take advantage of domestic resources too, which are removed from
other parts of the economy. Domestic workers benefit as foreign
companies compete for their loyalty by raising their wages, but
this imposes costs, both on the domestic firms they leave, and on
all firms that must meet higher wage requirements.21 To claim
that SEZs “create jobs” is therefore partially misleading. SEZs do
benefit workers, but as long as not all of them were previously
unemployed, SEZ investors hire people at the expense of
domestic companies.
This logic applies similarly to production inputs and other
forms of capital. As foreign investors bid up prices, they inevitably
impose costs on other companies. In a functioning market
economy, resources seldom lie idle. It is good for the producers of
these production inputs that prices rise, but this is far from the
full story.
The value of the alternative use of either labor or capital
cannot be measured with any precision. Attempts have been
made for simpler forms of SEZs, as was previously mentioned,
but such analyses will always remain best guesses rather than
proven costs.
Because several of these costs are difficult to measure, it is
hard for a government to know whether the zones they are
promoting actually benefit the economy. In their pursuit to
increase growth and economic activity, they cannot ever be sure
this is actually accomplished. Most analyses of SEZs presume that
if a zone attracts investors and functions well, it has been a good
project. However, knowing about the hidden costs of SEZs, a
proper analysis must obviously be more complicated.
A. Policy Implications
A government initiating SEZs should consider how it can best
lower its cost in relation to the benefit of any SEZ. Government
spending on infrastructure may be necessary to attract investors
to a zone, but will be profitable only in certain circumstances. For

20
21

Id. at 9.
Id.
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one, any SEZ must be placed in areas where investors want to go.
Numerous SEZ projects have been poorly located, resulting in
unused infrastructure and office space. Such “white elephants”
present obvious examples of SEZ failure.22
In the less obvious case of failure, SEZs attract investors, but
at a price not worth paying for the people of the country. Any
location might be attractive to investors when endowed with
enough government resources. By choosing a proper location, the
government can minimize how much it has to “compensate”
investors by paying them to come.23
Infrastructure investments must also be suitable for the kind
of production that is located in the zone. In order not to waste
resources, the government must choose carefully what kind of
production they target with its incentives and regulations.
All of this may seem to impose an insurmountable burden on
policy makers introducing SEZs. Yet, rather than requiring them to
know the perfect location and policy framework for every zone,
people in power are better off recognizing that they are not
omniscient, and should therefore prudently set policies accordingly.
SEZs work by rearranging economic activity in a country, with
the goal of increasing economic activity as a whole.24 As such, there
are inherent problems of assessing the cost of any changes in the
current market structure. Companies in the country are located at
particular spots for a reason. If they enter the SEZs, they are
generally leaving a naturally optimal location for an inferior one,
lured by fiscal incentives. It is also likely that international
investors would not prefer the location of an SEZ, but are
nevertheless incentivized to invest in the zone.
Governments may get around the problem of resource
misallocation by allowing for a more market-driven process in
finding an SEZ location. If a government relies on private parties
for SEZ development, people with better understanding of market
conditions seek out the most lucrative location to establish an SEZ.
The private zone model works as follows. The government
announces the SEZ legislation, including the incentives offered
and what kind of activities are permitted in the zones. Private
developers must then buy or lease land and make all the necessary
investments to establish the SEZs. A zone developer can then lease
space to zone investors, who are willing to pay for the fiscal
benefits, the infrastructure and services in the zone, and for the
22
23
24

See id. at 36.
See id.
See id. at 25.
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proximity to peers and suppliers. The government need not be part
of the location selection, but can still claim credit for the success
of the policy.
In addition to zone location, it is also unlikely that the
government will know what the best industries will be for its
SEZs. The government may think that it is textile production if
that has traditionally been a widely spread type of production in
the country. In fact, the economy may be better off diversifying
into other types of manufacturing, more sophisticated agriculture,
or high-technology production.25 The reverse is probably an even
more common mistake. A government might believe that the
economy should take unrealistic leaps into high-tech areas of
production.26 In fact, what a country is already producing likely
reflects its inherent comparative advantage, implying that it
should focus on those industries going forward. Targeting the
wrong industry can be a costly mistake for the government.
Fortunately, private zone developers can also address the
problem of finding the right kind of production. Private developers
have both the incentive and expertise to assess what industries
should fit for a particular location in a particular country. If
potential investors are unknown, they can delay infrastructure
investments until later, or work together with interested investors
to provide the required business environment.27 For private
investors, the costs of poorly targeted infrastructure investments
are more immediate. As a result, they are more prone to step
carefully in finding a successful zone model.
Importantly, when private developers do make mistakes and
fail to attract investors, it does not impose large costs on the
country’s tax payers. SEZs may thus fail by not attracting
investors, but may still be neutral from a cost-benefit perspective
to the host country. The reason governments are often reluctant to
rely on private SEZs is that they cannot claim credit for
introducing a job-creating policy if the zones fail to grow. When
areas designated as SEZs are left idle, this constitutes political
failure, even if the attempt to establish zones imposed costs only
on private developers and not on the country’s tax payers.
For this reason, a government may prefer that zone
development be in the hands of a public authority. If so, it should
consider decentralizing the process down to the local level. The
United States has adopted this model to a large extent. American

25
26
27

See id. at 5–6.
See id. at 38.
See id. at 56.
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zones are often developed by county or city governments or their
subdivisions, such as port authorities.28 This is a politically safe
model, which is less likely than a centralized model to waste
resources. Yet, even with decentralization, government-developed
SEZs are prone to waste if the targeted locations or SEZ activities
are suboptimal. However, in some cases, U.S. zones can be
privately developed as well.29 In these cases, the federal
government stays out of involvement in zone development and
leaves this up to the local entities.
Local politicians are more knowledgeable about the
immediate business environment of any given area and are thus
more likely to make informed decisions. They may also perceive
and react to zone failure more rapidly and adjust policies
accordingly. In addition, with fiscal decentralization, it becomes
harder for local politicians to conceal the costs of an SEZ. While
this means costs are more concentrated and can thus do more
harm locally, it also makes it less likely for those costs to rise
beyond proportion. As such, while decentralization does not
ameliorate the problem with SEZ failure ultimately becoming a
burden on tax payers, it is at least a second-best solution after
zone privatization.
B. SEZs and Rent-Seeking
Besides policy makers not having sufficient information to
create the perfect SEZ policy, they may also lack the will to do so.
One inherent problem with SEZs is that they offer various kinds of
opportunities for rent-seeking. It is the nature of a discriminatory
policy that it offers people or businesses special treatments. This
inevitably creates the incentive for private-sector actors to land on
the right side of the policy.30 Even more destructively, policy
makers have the incentive to introduce policies that make it easier
for businesses to engage in policy manipulation by offering the
policy makers various gifts and favors.31
SEZs offer beneficial tax, tariff, and regulatory conditions for
the businesses granted the privilege to enter.32 As long as there is
any kind of selection between investors, there is an opportunity for
28 See Who Can Apply?, U.S. FOREIGN-TRADE ZONES BOARD, https://enforcement.trade.
gov/ftzpage/info/applicant.html [http://perma.cc/N85T-BU8J] (last visited Nov. 11, 2017).
29 Id.
30 JAMES M. BUCHANAN & ROGER D. CONGLETON, POLITICS BY PRINCIPLE, NOT
INTEREST: TOWARD NONDISCRIMINATORY DEMOCRACY 3 (1998); Anne O. Krueger, The
Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291, 291–92 (1974).
31 John Joseph Wallis, The Concept of Systematic Corruption in American History, in
CORRUPTION AND REFORM: LESSONS FROM AMERICA’S ECONOMIC HISTORY 23, 50–51
(Edward L. Glaeser & Claudia Goldin eds., 2006).
32 Id.
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rent-seeking.33 Businesses may bribe policy makers outright,
lobby for the rules to change in their favor, or induce policy makers
to make exceptions for them if they do not fulfill the criteria.34
Bribe-taking may not impose an obvious cost on the people of
the country. After all, policy makers are benefiting at the expense
of companies, and not directly at the expense of the people of the
country. However, as businesses incur higher costs for entering
the zones, they have less money for capital expenditures and for
hiring people. As a result, they will produce, export, and benefit
the country’s workers to a lesser extent. Rent-seeking through
SEZs thus transfers resources from workers and the
government which loses out on income tax revenues to
individual officials.
Even if the SEZ legislators try honestly to make the policy
work, rent-seeking can occur in various levels of the government
bureaucracy. The more agencies a business must pass to obtain
their SEZ entrance, the larger is the risk of bureaucrats
extracting rents along the way, thus diminishing the benefits of
zone investing.35
Rent-seeking is more likely to occur in certain kinds of SEZs.
In short, the smaller and simpler the zones, the easier it is to use
them as vehicles for corruption.36 The smallest kind of zone is
the single-factory zone, which includes only one company.37
Single-factory zones make it easy for government to select
particular investors for fiscal benefits. Governments often
motivate these schemes with the need of certain businesses to be
located in particular spots, such as in the center of cities, where
one cannot set up regular SEZs. While this is a sound argument,
the problem with introducing single-factory zones is that they
easily serve as ways to give favors to specific companies. If a policy
maker wants his uncle to benefit, for example, he can designate
the uncle’s business as an SEZ, prompting the government to
provide a source of extra profits.
It is understandable that such a scheme would often be
confused with simple government favoritism and targeting of
benefits of individual companies. In practice, there is
little difference. There will also be no agglomerative effects with
See MOBERG, supra note 13, at 46.
Krueger, supra note 30, at 292.
See, e.g., WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR GROWTH: ECONOMISTS’
ADVENTURES AND MISADVENTURES IN THE TROPICS 247 (2002) (arguing that low-level
corruption creates a tragedy-of-the-commons problem as bureaucrats maximize their gains
from implementing policies that benefit companies).
36 See MOBERG, supra note 13, at 56–57.
37 Id. at 6, 43.
33
34
35
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single-factory zones, even though this is a common rationale for
SEZs. Despite these drawbacks, single-factory zones are found in
numerous countries with SEZ policies, the United States among
them. It is certainly possible that rent-seeking in some cases
drives their proliferation.
The more zone benefits that emanate from the government,
the harder it will be for to rid an SEZ scheme of rent-seeking.
The more opportunities for businesses to gain from lobbying
and graft, the more resources will be wasted on such activities.
The best a government can do in that case is to distance itself
from the provision of favors, through infrastructure provisions
and selection of SEZ investors. That is, it can allow for private
zone development.
In addition to solving problems of finding the right location
and zone production, private SEZs can also solve several problems
related to rent-seeking. Private developers profit from the rents
they charge investors. They have little incentive to extract
additional rents illegally from private zone investors, as this
diminishes the ability of those investors to pay rents the legal way.
Private zone development thus means that there are fewer
incentives for rent-seeking and less opportunity to trade rents for
fiscal benefits.
Private developers can reap higher profits only by using their
resources in more efficient ways. They can, for instance, find more
cost-efficient forms of infrastructure, they can provide better
services and charge higher rents, and plan for agglomerative
effects that will help improve investor profits. All of these are ways
to create value and thus increase the probability of a successful
SEZ. By contrast, the government’s main tool to attract investors
is to increase fiscal incentives. 38 This does not necessarily imply
a better way of organizing production more efficiently in a
zone—which is the way private developers are incentivized to do.
The larger and more diversified the zones, the less likely rentseeking will be a major problem. With zones the size of cities,
where people work, live, and study, the government cannot
possibly attract investors by providing all the buildings. It must
rely on private planning and investment to make the zone
function. The larger the zones, the more open they must be for
people to enter and invest. This limits the government’s ability to
target benefits to certain sectors. Finally, larger zones make it
harder to target specific companies. Because it will be difficult to
benefit a specific company, fiscal incentives must be offered to

38

Tiefenbrun, supra note 12, at 12.
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everyone in the zone, which is more expensive the larger the
zone is. As a result, large zones are harder for governments to
use as vehicles for rent-seeking, for which single-factory zones
are so suitable. 39
Decentralization may solve some of the problems with rentseeking, albeit less effectively than private zone development.40 At
least in a democratic system, local policy makers are more
incentivized to promote the economy through their policy-making.
It is easier for the people to see the connection between their
actions and social welfare. Come next election, policy makers risk
losing their power if they fail to live up to expectations. Thus, when
managing an SEZ scheme, they are less likely than central
government officials to engage in graft at the expense of economic
success of the program.
The incentive to avoid corruption does not, however, apply to
less accountable officials. Bureaucrats dealing with SEZ
applications, for instance, are seldom held accountable for poor
economic performance and can therefore engage in graft (as long
as they are not caught) without major repercussions.41
Decentralization with checks and balances, therefore, is only a
partial solution to the rent-seeking problem, and will alleviate the
problem only in particular circumstances.
In conclusion, SEZs do introduce some efficiencies to the
economy. But because of their discriminatory nature, they also
present problems related to insufficient knowledge and distorted
incentives. In the worst case, these problems render SEZs worse
for an economy than the status quo. That is, even a country with
high barriers to trade, taxes too high even to maximize
government revenue, and a prohibitive business climate may be
better off keeping such policies and shunning SEZs.
The main solution to these problems is private zone
development. This zone model has been recognized as producing
better results than public zones and is becoming increasingly
popular as a result.42 Yet policy makers are often reluctant to cede
control over a program to the private sector. They may want to
benefit a particular part of the country or take credit for
introducing a particular industry in the country. As a result,
government-developed zones remain common throughout the
world. Any SEZ study should therefore account for the extent of

39
40
41
42

MOBERG, supra note 13, at 46.
See id. at 42.
See id. at 50.
See FAROLE, supra note 2, at 37–39; Akinci & Crittle, supra note 1, at 4.
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privately-driven investments in the zone. This may give a first clue
about whether the scheme is even better than the status quo.
C. Case Studies of Zone Failure
Throughout the history of SEZs, numerous programs have
either failed to attract investors or been so infused by
mismanagement, miscalculations, and inefficiencies that any
benefits they generated failed to compensate for the costs. This
Section explains how SEZ schemes can look successful, but
nevertheless fail to benefit the country as a whole due to hidden
costs. In some cases, failure is obvious as SEZs fail to take off
despite government investments in infrastructure and facilities.
One vivid example of this is the Calabar zone in Nigeria. The
location of the zone looked completely rational, primarily because
of its proximity to the Calabar port.43 The plan was to dredge the
port so that it could serve ships that would export the
manufactured goods of the Calabar SEZ.44 However, for several
years, the authorities tasked with the dredging failed to fulfill this
mission. Goods were therefore shipped by truck to the port of
Lagos at high costs. The Calabar zone is close to the Cameroonian
border and not connected to any of Nigeria’s highways. The
government ran the zone and chose not to privatize it. Power
supply to the zone was unreliable, which forced businesses to run
generators for electricity.45 It is no wonder that the number of
investors was a small share of the capacity of the zone.46 As a
result, much of the SEZ infrastructure was left idle.47
Nigeria’s SEZs have seen most investments in oil-related
industries.48 Most SEZ incentives have thus been given to oil
extraction and production. Because oil is a lucrative and established
industry in Nigeria, these SEZ incentives may not have done much
to increase production and employment in the country.49
Another case of obvious failure is the SEZ of Bataan in the
Philippines. The area was the site of a former U.S. military base,
and the plan was to use the existing infrastructure to create a zone

FAROLE, supra note 2, at 204.
See id.
45 Id. at 219.
46 See id. at 211–12.
47 Id. at 187; Martin Norman, Have ‘Special Economic Zones’ Entered the 21st Century
Yet? A Tale of Two Cities, WORLD BANK (Mar. 28, 2014), http://blogs.worldbank.org/psd/havespecial-economic-zones-entered-21st-century-yet-tale-two-cities [http://perma.cc/ULZ9-BRUA].
48 FAROLE, supra note 2, at 78.
49 Ebehi Iyoha, Nigerian Free Trade Zones: As Simple as SEZ, S TEARS B US.
(June 22, 2017), https://www.stearsng.com/article/nigerian-free-trade-zones-as-simple-as-sez
[http://perma.cc/7GFK-H4D2].
43
44
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attractive to investors. The government invested hundreds of
millions of dollars in the zone in the 1970s and 1980s.50 The port
was upgraded as the bridges and roads connecting the zone to
highways and the like were inadequate.
Nevertheless, the business potential for the zone remained
weak and investors stayed away. The zone was allegedly too
remote. Thus, in this case, even substantial government spending
in the zone did not make it grow. Sixteen years after its founding,
the Bataan zone actually became a case of failure that made the
international community question the zone model.51 With time,
the government spent even more money on the zone. It now hosts
investors, so it is considered a success. However, this remains a
case where the zone benefits for the economy can hardly live up to
all the public investments made throughout the years.
Because of their obvious failures, SEZs such as Nigeria’s
Calabar zone and Bataan of the Philippines get the worse press.
Yet they are likely not as costly for a country as zone schemes that
look successful enough to continue without meaningful reforms,
while relying on large investments from the government coupled
with generous fiscal incentives. Thus, in contrast to the Calabar
and Bataan SEZs, most unsuccessful SEZs in the world are likely
not recognized as such. These are the zones that attract investors,
but at a cost that cannot be justified on the basis of the benefit
they bring to the country as a whole.
As mentioned previously, there have been attempts at
cost-benefit analyses for functional SEZs. These get to the question
of whether zones are actually better than the status quo and do not
just take it for granted whenever a zone attracts investors. Warr
lays out a framework for cost-benefit analysis of export processing
zones.52 Building on Warr’s work, Jayanthakumaran assesses the
net benefit of zones.53 Their evaluations of specific SEZ schemes
indicate that the zones in the Philippines were a net negative for
the economy, while those in South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri
Lanka, and China were beneficial.54
India’s SEZ present a prominent example of a scheme that
was maintained despite its high costs. The rest of this chapter will
therefore look closer at this case. India introduced its first zone in

See MOBERG, supra note 13, at 36.
See Peter G. Warr, Export Promotion via Industrial Enclaves: The Philippines’
Bataan Export Processing Zone, 23 J. DEV. STUD. 220, 238–39 (1987); MOBERG, supra note
13, at 36.
52 Warr, supra note 14, at 77–81.
53 Jayanthakumaran, supra note 14, at 53–56.
54 Id. at 58.
50
51
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1965, but it took another eight years to establish a second one.55
In 2002, the country still had only seven SEZs.56 To put this in the
context of the county’s development, India saw increased GDP
growth in 1980, and even more so in the 1990s, after economically
liberal reforms.57 This was a turnaround period for India, which
previously had seen the so-called “Hindu rate of growth” of only
around 1.7% in real terms between 1950 and 1985.58
The SEZs seem to have played no part in this success. In 1984,
around the time that the economy started to take off, India had
only two SEZs.59 The share of Indian exports stemming from the
zones never exceeded four percent before 1996 and reached five
percent only in 1998.60 Also, while Indian growth relied primarily
on services, the SEZs were more manufacturing oriented.61
Why, then, did the scheme show such poor results? Was it a
matter of poor knowledge of government officials or distorted
incentives? Alas, it seems, the answer is both. It is therefore worth
taking a closer look at these issues, one at the time.
Much of the knowledge problem for Indian SEZs stemmed
from the centralized nature of the scheme. The zones were
government funded and thus came at a cost for the Indian
taxpayers.62 In addition, from the start of the program until 1994,
only the central government could set up a zone, after which state
governments, agencies, and private investors could take on SEZ
projects.63 SEZ policies were in the hands of a unit of the ministry
of commerce. Furthermore, the task of approving investors

55 Aradhna Aggarwal, Export Processing Zones in India: Analysis of the Export
Performance 4 (Indian Council for Res. on Int’l Econ. Relations, Working Paper No. 148,
2004), http://icrier.org/pdf/wp148.pdf [http://perma.cc/AL53-9TUM].
56 Id. at 14.
57 Id. at 12.
58 Penn World Table: The Database, UNIV. OF GRONINGEN, https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/
productivity/pwt/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2017). This growth increased to 4.6% between 1985
and 2010. IMF data suggests that the growth 1985–2010 was 5.3%. See World Economic
Outlook Database, International Monetary Fund, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/
2016/01/weodata/index.aspx (last visited Nov. 3, 2017). For reference to “Hindu growth,”
see Dani Rodrik & Arvind Subramanian, From “Hindu Growth” to Productivity Surge: The
Mystery of the Indian Growth Transition 193–94 (International Monetary Fund, Working
Paper, May 2004).
59 Aggarwal, supra note 55, at 5.
60 Id. at 5, 10, 13; Penn World Table: The Database, supra note 58. For discussion on
the Penn World Table methodology, see Robert C. Feenstra, Robert Inklaar & Marcel
P. Timmer, The Next Generation of the Penn World Table, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 3150,
3150 (2015).
61 Ashok Kotwal, Bharat Ramaswami & Wilima Wadhwa, Economic Liberalization
and Indian Economic Growth: What’s the Evidence?, 49 J. ECON. LIT. 1152, 1168–69 (2011).
62 Triyakshana Seshadri & Virgil Henry Storr, Knowledge Problems Associated with
Creating Export Zones, 23 REV. AUSTRIAN ECON. 347, 351 (2010).
63 Ram Krishna Ranjan, Special Economic Zones: Are They Good for the Country? 8
(Ctr. for Civil Soc’y, Working Paper No. 156, 2006).
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seeking to enter the zones was given to an authority placed under
this same ministry.64
In a country the size of India, centralized policy-making is
bound to suffer from the limited knowledge of government officials
about the conditions on the ground in various parts of the country.
For the SEZs, one result of this flaw was the poor location of the
initial SEZs in Kandla, a port city, and Falta, located by the
Hooghly River, not far from Kolkata.65 Both locations allegedly
lacked not only an industrial culture, but also the necessary social
and economic infrastructure.66 The government later set up some
zones in areas that already showed decent industrial performance,
and these SEZs fared better.67
It certainly does not seem that the government had an insight
about the potential of Kandla and Falta that private investors,
which largely stayed away from these areas, were lacking. Falta,
in particular, remained a small part of the SEZ scheme, providing
only one percent of its exports by 2000.68 Had the zones been
privately developed, poor location choices would not have been
such bad news. The companies invested in the zones would have
lost money and been forced to relocate and start over. Alas,
because much of the initial investments came from the central
government, the poorly located zones inevitably imposed costs for
the Indian economy as a whole.
In an attempt to improve the SEZ scheme, the Indian
government introduced a new SEZ law that came into effect in
2005. Importantly, the law encourages privately developed zones.69
Some of the authority of SEZ management is also transferred from
the central government to the state government level.70 The new
law concentrates significant power in local-level development
commissioners, who have both regulatory and administrative
powers. This framework has been criticized as an “extreme

64 Aradhna Aggarwal, Performance of Export Processing Zones: A Comparative Analysis
of India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh 15–16 (Indian Council for Res. on Int’l Econ. Rel.,
Working Paper No. 155, 2005), http://icrier.org/pdf/wp155.pdf [http://perma.cc/93LY-TEQF].
65 ASHOK KUNDRA, THE PERFORMANCE OF INDIA’S EXPORT ZONES: A COMPARISON WITH
THE CHINESE APPROACH 66 (2000).
66 Id.
67 Seshadri & Storr, supra note 62, at 361.
68 Id. at 353.
69 AMITENDU PALIT & SUBHOMOY BHATTACHARJEE, SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN
INDIA: MYTHS AND REALITIES 174 (2008).
70 See Shankar Gopalakrishnan, SEZs in India: An Economic Policy or a Political
Intervention?, in SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN ASIAN MARKET ECONOMIES 139, 143 (Connie
Carter & Andrew Harding eds., 2011); PALIT & BHATTACHARJEE, supra note 69, at 174;
Jona Aravind Dohrmann, Special Economic Zones in India – An Introduction, 106 ASIEN
60, 66 (2008); Introduction, SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN INDIA, http://www.sezindia.nic.
in/about-introduction.asp [http://perma.cc/5W5D-83BX] (last visited Nov. 12, 2017).
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centralization of government institutions.”71 However, while such
a concentration may be unwise, a more local authority is at least
more likely to understand the local market conditions, and can
better design SEZs commensurate to the development potential of
any area. Still, the main authority accepting applications for
approval to establish new SEZs remains a central-government
function.72 India has thus gone only some of the way to a
decentralized system for its SEZs.
Indian land policy contributes to SEZ-related misallocation of
resources. In an unregulated market, land owners could sell land
to prospective SEZ developers if the latter are willing to pay more
than the land is worth for the land owners, many of whom are
farmers. This exchange would signal that the land had a higher
potential value as an SEZ than for its current use. However, in
India, land prices do not reflect supply and demand because they
are set by the state government. This price must, by law, reflect
the value of the current use of the land, and can thus not exceed
the value of the land derived from farming.73 Such a system
discourages land transactions from ever taking place.
The government’s solution to the potential dearth of land
transactions is eminent domain. By law, the government has the
right to expropriate land “for ‘any public purpose or for a
company.’”74 The opportunity to seize land for SEZ use is further
enhanced as zones are designated as public utility services, which
per definition, are useful for social welfare.75
Fair or not, the system disguises the information that is
embedded in market-derived prices. It thus makes it even harder
for the government to determine the economic benefit of
establishing an SEZ.
It is still unclear whether the new SEZ law sufficiently deals
with the flaws of the previous system, but in the absence of change
in the land laws, this is doubtful. The increasing number of private
SEZ developers will need to turn to the state government to free
up land for them, thus discouraging the investors to make the

Dohrmann, supra note 70, at 69; see also Gopalakrishnan, supra note 70, at 148.
Introduction, supra note 70.
73 Triyakshana Seshadri, The Political Economy of Special Economic Zones in India
79 (Spring Semester 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, George Mason University),
https://search.proquest.com/docview/868552266?pq-origsite=gscholar.
74 SHRUTI RAJAGOPALAN & ALEXANDER TABARROK, LESSONS FROM GURGAON, INDIA’S
PRIVATE CITY 203 (2014), https://mason.gmu.edu/~atabarro/Lessons%20from%20Gurgaon.pdf
[http://perma.cc/M3CJ-ZCV5].
75 GOV’T OF INDIA MINISTRY OF COM. AND INDUSTRY, SEZ RULES INCORPORATING
AMENDMENTS UP TO JULY, 2010, ch. 2 (2006), http://sezindia.nic.in/upload/uploadfiles/files/
14_SEZ_Rules_July_2010.pdf [http://perma.cc/WSU5-8NUJ].
71
72
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proper cost-benefit analysis. It is therefore worth looking into
whether the new system is more likely to solve the incentive
problems that plagued the SEZ policies of the past.
One prominent feature of the early SEZ scheme was the wide
use of the single-factory model, which was introduced in 1981.76 As
previously discussed, such zones are potent tools for rent-seeking
and lack the positive cluster-effects that are a prominent rationale
for setting up SEZs. By the year 1998, 1210 single-factory zones
were operational, and by 2009, as many as 2600.77 As the selection
process for companies designated as single-factory zones is not one
based on competitive potential, it is not surprising that these
companies seem not to live up to their export goals.78
Encouragingly, the new SEZ law aims to create larger zones,
which should steer the country away from the single-factory
model. However, an initial minimum zone size of 1000 hectares
was soon compromised down to 500 hectares, with exemptions for
agriculture and IT companies.79 By 2008, only six percent of the
zones were larger than 300 hectares, and forty percent were
smaller than twenty hectares.80 The government even chose to set
a maximum SEZ size of 5000 hectares due to land disputes.81 For
perspective, the Chinese pioneering SEZ of Shenzhen covered
32,750 hectares in 1980, a year after its founding.82
While smaller zones are generally more prone to incentive
problems, additional problems are introduced in India because of
its land laws. With suppressed land prices combined with eminent
domain, SEZ developers are incentivized to lobby officials to seize
land on their behalf. Land will thus be found in the hands of those
with the largest political influence, rather than those able to create
the most value.

76 Export Oriented Unit Scheme, EOU INDIA, http://eouindia.gov.in/eou_scheme.htm
[http://perma.cc/3KXL-9JGB] (last visited Nov. 12, 2017).
77 Facts and Figures, EOU I NDIA , http://eouindia.gov.in/fact_figure.htm
[http://perma.cc/56NB-H3TD] (last visited Nov. 12, 2017).
78 Niloptal Goswami & Pravakar Sahoo, Why have export-oriented units in India failed
to deliver?, BRUEGEL (Oct. 22, 2016), http://bruegel.org/2016/10/why-have-export-orientedunits-in-india-failed-to-deliver/ [http://perma.cc/Z4BC-PAAR].
79 Dohrmann, supra note 70, at 66–67; Letter from Rajeev Arora, Joint Sec’y to the
Gov’t of India, to The Chief Sec’ys of States/UTs 1 (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.sezindia.nic.
in/writereaddata/rules/Amendment%20rules.pdf [http://perma.cc/5GDU-VZMZ].
80 PARTHA MUKHOPADHYAY & KANHU CHARAN PRADHAN, LOCATION OF SEZS AND
POLICY BENEFITS WHAT DOES THE DATA SAY? 70–71 (2009), https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/24333/1/MPRA_paper_24333.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q8P2-LNDA].
81 See Gopalakrishnan, supra note 70, at 144.
82 April A. Herlevi, What’s so Special about Special Economic Zones? China’s National
and Provincial-Level Development Zones 14 (June 18, 2016) (unpublished research paper),
http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/AP%20Hong%20Kong%202016/Archive/3a83092acbfa-4526-85d7-3ca39931b3b4.pdf [http://perma.cc/83F5-AM6Y].
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Another problem that has plagued India’s SEZ scheme for
many years is bureaucratic corruption.83 Companies wanting to
invest in a zone would previously have to pass through numerous
authorities. This provided opportunities for rent-seeking as
bureaucrats could demand unofficial payments for their services.
A survey from 2004 found that sixty percent of responding SEZ
companies claimed to have made “irregular payments” payments
not registered in the books to the SEZ-related bureaucracies.84
The aim of the new scheme is to streamline the application
and approval process with a so-called “single window” facility.85
Yet it has taken time for such an institution to be set up. Admitting
as much, the central government appealed in 2010 to state
governments to set up their own single window facilities.86 By
2015, a survey found that sixty-four percent of SEZ firms reported
that no such facility existed in the state.87 SEZ investors are thus
still faced with several steps through the bureaucracy to obtain
approval. The bureaucratic problems with SEZs have contributed
to the de-notification of SEZs. While in 2013, India had 580
approved zones, there were only 405 in late 2016 and have since
risen to 424 by July 2017.88
In conclusion, while the Indian SEZ scheme is moving in the
right direction on some margins, it is yet to be seen whether this
will be enough to improve it significantly. Insufficient
decentralization and flawed land legislation will likely keep
causing problems related to governments not having enough
information to properly design an SEZ that would benefit the
country as a whole. Those same land laws, combined with a
burdensome SEZ bureaucracy and wide use of single-factory
zones, create distorted incentives that further discredit the claim
that the SEZs are meant to benefit the people.

83 See, e.g., S.R. Keshava, The Effect of FDI on India and Chinese Economy; A
Comparative Analysis 18 (Feb. 2, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1089964 [http://perma.cc/U45U-V7PL].
84 Aggarwal, supra note 55, at 32.
85 See Dohrmann, supra note 70, at 66; Introduction, supra note 70.
86 BS Reporter, Create single-window clearance for SEZs: Govt tells states, BUS.
STANDARD (Feb. 11, 2010, 11:06 AM), http://www.business-standard.com/article/economypolicy/create-single-window-clearance-for-sezs-govt-tells-states-110021200075_1.html
[http://perma.cc/5JNL-68RV].
87 PROGRESS HARMONY DEV. RES. BUREAU, SEZS IN INDIA: CRISS-CROSS CONCERNS
43 (2015).
88 See Set up a single-window clearance system for speedy approvals of special
economic zones: ASSOCHAM Plea to Govt., THE ASSOCIATED CHAMBERS OF COM. &
INDUSTRY OF INDIA (Nov. 30, 2015), http://www.assocham.org/newsdetail.php?id=5357
[http://perma.cc/JT4Z-FU2W]; Approved SEZs in India, SPECIAL ECON. ZONES IN INDIA
[http://perma.cc/N5T7-S3QU] (last visited Nov. 12, 2017).
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More private zone development should enhance the scheme.
During its decades of existence, the dominance of government
investment in India’s SEZs has imposed high costs that are
ultimately borne by the Indian taxpayer. The conclusion must
therefore be that India did not live up to the lowest bar of SEZ
success, in that the scheme was not even better than the political
status-quo.
III. COMPARING SEZS TO THEIR POLITICAL ALTERNATIVE
Even if SEZs are better than the status quo, they might still
not benefit a country if a superior set of policies could prevail in
their absence. For example, policy makers might feel compelled to
liberalize the economy and consider a cut in tariffs across the
board. As they ponder their options, they might learn about SEZs
and find them an attractive policy alternative. With SEZs, policy
makers can look as though they are actively promoting trade and
development for the country. A zone is a clearly-defined space
where policy makers claim credit for the economic activity that
they host. They can count the amount of foreign investors and
employees in the zone and win praise for how much capital it
attracted and how many jobs it created.89 There will obviously be
no mention of the public resources that the project consumed or
how many investors simply moved within the country to enjoy the
zone’s fiscal benefits.
Besides the political point-scoring, SEZs have another feature
that is even more attractive for protectionist-minded policy
makers. SEZs allow for a dual trade system, in which the country
as a whole can remain protectionist while opening up for imports
only in limited spaces. Governments often protect certain sectors
by limiting foreign competition.90 In exchange for this favor, they
can earn rents from the protected companies, in the form or
political support, favors, or outright bribes.91 Trade liberalization

89 See Chenggang Xu, The Fundamental Institutions of China’s Reforms and
Development, 49 J. ECON. LIT. 1076, 1093 (2011).
90 Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Economics Versus Politics: Pitfalls of Policy
Advice, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 173, 189 (2013).
91 See, e.g., Acemoglu & Robinson, supra note 90, at 186–87; Carlos F. Díaz Alejandro,
The Argentine Tariff, 1906–1940, 19 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 75, 95 (1967); Krueger, supra
note 30, at 291–92; J.J. Pincus, Pressure Groups and the Pattern of Tariffs, 83 J. POL. ECON.
757, 757–58 (1975); Robert E. Baldwin, The Political Economy of Protectionism, in IMPORT
COMPETITION AND RESPONSE 263, 278 (Jagdish N. Bhagwati ed., 1982); Robert E. Baldwin,
The Political Economy of Trade Policy, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 119, 125, 130 (1989); Arye L.
Hillman, Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives, 72 AM. ECON.
REV. 1180, 1181, 1185 (1982); Giulio M. Gallarotti, Toward a Business-Cycle Model of
Tariffs, 39 INT’L ORG. 155, 166–67 (1985); James H. Cassing & Arye L. Hillman, Shifting
Comparative Advantage and Senescent Industry Collapse, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 516, 522
(1986); Barry Eichengreen, The Political Economy of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, in
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threatens such relationships. If interest groups no longer receive
support from the government, they will be unwilling to offer
anything in return.
While this suggests that policy makers should never consider
trade liberalization, they may be forced to do so in the face of
pressure from other interests. Potential investors in the country
can complain about the lack of opportunity and widely declare that
the country is losing jobs by keeping foreign investors away.
Economists may write articles and speak out about how
protectionism is impoverishing the country’s people. Foreign trade
representatives may pressure the country to open up.
Such demands present the dilemma for the protectionist
government between yielding to the pressure and siding with its
protected interest groups. SEZs offer a way out of the situation. As
policy makers introduce zones, they can claim to pursue
liberalization. Meanwhile, they are still protecting the interest
groups from threatening imports by maintaining the protectionist
regime elsewhere. Foreign investors will be happy to enter the
zones, where they enjoy exemptions from tariffs and taxes, and
economists and foreign government representatives may accept
the partial liberalization as adequate, albeit not perfect.
In this way, SEZs can be a tool to avoid trade liberalization,
and thus serve a very different function from that with which
they are generally associated. They may improve on the status
quo. Yet they may not benefit the economy when the status quo
is not the relevant comparison. In the absence of SEZs, the policy
makers would likely need to liberalize the economy more broadly
in the face of pressure to do so. As a result, SEZs primarily benefit
policy makers and protected industries at the expense of the rest
of the society.
To understand whether SEZs are better than the status quo,
one must consider the political context and understand the
incentives of policy makers and the policy alternatives that they
face. Any counterfactual scenario will remain a hypothesis.
Nevertheless, this approach to assess SEZ benefits is superior to
the naïve assumption that policies will remain the same in their
absence. The very fact that a government introduces SEZs
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL POWER AND WEALTH 37,
37–38, 46 (Jeffry A. Frieden & David A. Lake eds., 4th ed. 2000); Avinash Dixit & John
Londregan, Redistributive Politics and Economic Efficiency, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 856, 858
(1995); Dani Rodrik, Political Economy of Trade Policy, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMICS 1457, 1468–69 (Gene M. Grossman & Kenneth Rogoff eds., 1995); Gene M.
Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics, 63 REV.
ECON. STUD. 265, 283–84 (1996); Jong-Wha Lee & Phillip Swagel, Trade Barriers and
Trade Flows Across Countries and Industries, 79 REV. ECON. & STAT. 372, 372–73 (1997).
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suggests that their incentives are not directly aligned with social
welfare. The officials may have suddenly awoken to the benefits of
economic openness. However, if the SEZs come in response to
pressure to liberalize trade, they may be a mere tool to avoid any
radical reforms.
A. The Case of the Dominican Republic
The Dominican Republic provides an example of SEZs
introduced as a response to pressure to liberalize the economy
broadly. The zones allow companies to import tariff-free and enjoy
tax exemptions. Meanwhile, these SEZs remain small enough not
to threaten the trade protection enjoyed by companies outside the
SEZs’ boundaries. As a result, while the zones promoted Dominican
exports, they also helped preserve a system of protectionism which,
in the absence of SEZs, might have been eroded.
In the 1960s, President Joaquín Balaguer inherited a country
with a system of trade protectionism, government benefits to
particular industries, and general government interventionism.92
The United States occupied the country for a while and helped
Balaguer reach his position of power, thus putting him in a
position of loyalty towards the American government.93
Balaguer was no natural sympathizer of free markets and
introduced new forms of trade protection in the country. On some
margins, though, these barriers were made more flexible.94 This,
combined with higher prices of the crops the Dominicans exported,
made the country wealthier, which increased the demand for
imported goods.95 Seeing that imports could threaten domestic
businesses, Balaguer responded by establishing even more solid
protectionism in the country.96

See FRANK MOYA PONS, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: A NATIONAL HISTORY 371 (2010).
Id. at 396, 398.
See Frank Moya Pons, Import-Substitution Industrialization Policies in the
Dominican Republic, 1925–61, 70 HISPANIC AM. HIST. REV. 539, 561 (1990); see also EMELIO
BETANCES, STATE AND SOCIETY IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 120–21 (1995); Andrew
Schrank, Luring, Learning, and Lobbying: The Limits to Capital Mobility in the Dominican
Republic, 37 STUD. COMP. INT’L DEV. 89, 95–96 (2003).
95 See DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: A COUNTRY STUDY (Richard A. Haggerty ed., 1989),
http://countrystudies.us/dominican-republic/ [http://perma.cc/AKQ5-VB3M].
96 See JAN KNIPPERS BLACK, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT
IN AN UNSOVEREIGN STATE 44, 63 (1986); see also PONS, supra note 92, at 396–97; Fabio
Rafael Fiallo, Alternativas de Política Industrial en la República Dominicana [Industrial
Policy Alternatives in the Dominican Republic], El TRIMESTRE ECONÓMICO [ETE] 159, 162
(1973); JONATHAN HARTLYN, THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRATIC POLITICS IN THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC 104–05 (1998); Andrew Schrank, Foreign Investors, “Flying Geese,” and the
Limits to Export-Led Industrialization in the Dominican Republic, 32 THEORY & SOC’Y 415,
422–24 (2003).
92
93
94
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His policies soon met resistance from several corners.
Importantly, the U.S. government pushed for trade liberalization
in order to access the Dominican market.97 To respond to these
demands, while still protecting the important interest groups that
represented domestically focused businesses opposed to foreign
competition, Balaguer introduced SEZs in 1968. The new law
offered companies two types of benefits: either trade protection or
SEZ status that came with fiscal benefits. The law made the
system of tariffs more systematic than previously, and offered
attractive opportunities to monopolize the domestic market. The
protectionist benefits were considered most attractive and were
primarily seized by the politically connected elite in Santo
Domingo. The SEZ benefits were considered less attractive and
were claimed primarily by the less-connected manufacturers
outside the capital.98
While this form of liberalization was not all the United States
had hoped for, the American government accepted the new rules
as a partial opening of the economy.99 Balaguer thus succeeded in
preserving and even strengthening the protectionist regime while
pleasing the critics asking for more liberalization. In the absence
of SEZs, the president might have had to pursue broader measures
of liberalization.
The Dominican zones have been praised for diversifying the
country’s exports and for offering employment opportunities.100
Yet, it has also been noted that the SEZs function as isolated
enclaves that fail to transfer their sophistication and growth to the
rest of the economy.101 An understanding of the political purpose

97 See generally Ved P. Nanda, The United States Action in the 1965 Dominican Crisis:
Impact on World Order – Part II, 44 DENV. L.J. 225 (1966); see also BETANCES, supra note
94, at 120–21; HARTLYN, supra note 96, at 105; Schrank, supra note 94, at 95; Schrank,
supra note 96, at 423; PONS, supra note 92, at 402.
98 See DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 95; BETANCES, supra note
94, at 121; Andrew Schrank, Entrepreneurship, Export Diversification, and Economic
Reform: The Birth of a Developmental Community in the Dominican Republic, 38 COMP.
POL. 43, 46–47 (2005); Andrew Schrank, Peasants, Planters, and the Predatory State:
Export Diversification in the Dominican Republic, 1970-2000, 10 RES. RURAL SOC. & DEV.
353, 355 (2005); Schrank, supra note 94, at 97.
99 See Schrank, supra note 94, at 95.
100 See Larry Willmore, Export Processing in the Caribbean: Lessons from Four Case
Studies 19 (Econ. Comm’n for Latin America and the Caribbean, Working Paper No. 42,
1996), http://archivo.cepal.org/pdfs/1996/S9600501.pdf [http://perma.cc/JF9W-6ZWA];
ADOZONA, IMPACTO ECONÓMICO Y SOCIAL DE LAS ZONAS FRANCAS: UNA VISIÓN DE 360
GRADOS [ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACT OF F REE ZONES : A 360 DEGREE VIEW]
19 (2012), https://adozona.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/impacto-economico.pdf
[http://perma.cc/8MM7-BXPF]; T HOMAS F AROLE, W ORLD BANK , U NLOCKING CENTRAL
AMERICA'S EXPORT POTENTIAL 4 (2012).
101 See Raphael Kaplinsky, Export Processing Zones in the Dominican Republic:
Transforming Manufactures into Commodities, 21 WORLD DEV. 1851, 1857 (1993); see also
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of the zones explains this outcome. Because the SEZs were
meant to divide the economy into the traditional protected sector
and the internationally open and export-oriented sector, the
latter was never supposed to integrate much with the country at
large because that would have eroded the traditional system of
trade protection.
The final verdict of the Dominican zones is ambiguous. They
were better than the status quo of protectionism, but as tools to
avoid reform, they were probably worse than the political
alternative of broader economic liberalization.
IV. WHEN SEZS LIVE UP TO THEIR BEST POSSIBLE OUTCOME
So far, several flaws with SEZs have been discussed that are
commonly overlooked in analyses of their success. When the
political economy perspective is ignored, problems of resource
misallocation, rent-seeking, and reform avoidance are overlooked.
Yet ignorance of the political economy aspects of SEZs also leads
to an under appreciation of what SEZs can accomplish when they
are at their best. This Part will examine how SEZs can help solve
the problem of rent-seeking.
One of the great problems in economic development is that
destructive policies and institutions are commonly preserved
because the ruling elite lacks the incentive to promote economic
progress. Trade restrictions are but one example. Regulations can
deter businesses from investing while doing little to protect
consumers or preserve market stability. Tax systems can be too
complex to comprehend, while offering too many loopholes to yield
much government revenue. The list of seemingly irrational policies
can be made long.
A simplistic analysis may deem such policies uninformed. Yet
they often come about and remain in place due to highly rational
calculations from individuals in government. Most interest groups
can benefit from regulations that restrict the power of their
competitors. They thus have an incentive to pressure the
government to introduce seemingly irrational rules. Every burden
on the business community is also an opportunity for people in
government to demand favors in exchange for exemptions.
As a result, policy makers generally lack the incentive to
simplify rules and make the system fairer and more transparent.
This leads countries into destructive states of equilibria that

Diego Sánchez-Ancochea, A Fast Herd and a Slow Tortoise? The Challenge of Upgrading in
the Dominican Republic, 47 STUD. COMP. INT’L DEV. 208, 218–20 (2012).
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hamper their development, discourage investments, and confine
people to poverty.102
This is precisely the context in which SEZs can function at
their best. By changing the incentives for policy makers,
they can set countries on a gradual path towards more
growth-promoting policies.
In a system where the government prefers to preserve a
protectionist status quo, any initiative for a change will not come
from the top, but instead from interest groups that would benefit
from liberalization. Just as some groups will pressure the
government to introduce growth-suppressing policies, others will
seek exemptions from them. A leather manufacturer, for instance,
might lobby for tariffs on leather, while a clothes manufacturer
would prefer exemptions from the same. One way to obtain more
general exemptions is to introduce SEZs. In contrast to specific
exemptions, SEZs can create a dynamic that spreads economic
liberalization throughout the country.
This dynamic starts with initiatives from people close to the
SEZs who will benefit from more openness. This may be business
people seeking new opportunities or local policy makers hoping to
expand the local government coffers through more economic
activity. Assuming most people in power are against more
openness, such reformers need to offer favors or bribes in exchange
for an SEZ. The zone, while not perfect, is the best they can obtain
in the face of strong resistance to change.
As the SEZ grows by attracting more investors, it starts
having an impact on the economy at large. Some local monopolies
wither as the SEZ inflicts more competition. Other opportunities
for rent-seeking weaken as businesses move from other parts of
the country to the SEZ with its inviting business environment. The
country starts gaining the reputation of a more open economy.
All these factors change the calculation and optimal strategy
of local policy makers. They can pursue two different strategies of

102 See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson, Political Losers as a Barrier to
Economic Development, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 126, 126 (2000); DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES
ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY 243–44
(2012); Stephen Haber, Introduction: The Political Economy of Crony Capitalism, in CRONY
CAPITALISM AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICA: THEORY AND EVIDENCE xi, xii,
xv–xvi (Stephen Haber ed., 2002); DAVID C. KANG, CRONY CAPITALISM: CORRUPTION AND
DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH KOREA AND THE PHILIPPINES 187 (2002); Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Introduction and Overview to INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF
CORRUPTION xiv, xiv (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 2006); John V.C. Nye, Why Do Elites
Permit Reform?, 1 ANN. PROC. WEALTH & WELL-BEING NATIONS 53, 55 (2008–2009);
Fernanda Brollo, Tommaso Nannicini, Roberto Perotti & Guido Tabellini, The Political
Resource Curse, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 1759, 1760 (2013).
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enriching themselves: they can promote growth and benefit from
higher tax revenue, or they can rent-seek by pursuing
protectionism, giving monopoly rights to select companies. Thanks
to their external effects, SEZs nudge this calculation towards more
openness and reliance on tax revenue as opposed to rents from
rent-seeking activities. As the first SEZ expands, more local
leaders find they can benefit from more openness.
As long as most leaders are against liberalization, no local
leader can possibly convince the government to pursue nationwide
liberalization. That would threaten too many interest groups from
which the government draws its support. Yet they can enjoy most
of the fruits of openness by obtaining SEZs, which are less
threatening to rent-seeking anti-reformers.
This process does not require a miscalculation of the impact of
SEZs by any anti-reformist leader who accepts the zones in
exchange for favors. The external effects come only after some
time, perhaps several years. If the anti-reformers do not expect to
be in power at that time, they are better off accepting the bribe
today, at the expense of their successors who will lose out on
rent-seeking opportunities.
The process requires a system of fiscal decentralization,
though, which allows local leaders to benefit from local tax
collection. If not, they would always be better off promoting
rent-seeking at the expense of tax collection. With fiscal
decentralization, local leaders face a trade-off between tax
revenues and gains from rent-seeking, as they cannot promote one
without diminishing the other.
The process is necessarily gradual and can take decades,
depending on the size of the country. It may not seem like a great
proposition for SEZs. Yet if the zones can change the equilibrium
of rent-seeking in a country, they provide the solution to one of the
main obstacles to economic development.
A. How SEZs Reformed China
China offers the most prominent example of a country that
used SEZs to profoundly change the economic system of the
country. As will be discussed, the SEZs worked to change the
incentives of political leaders to promote reform in a context where
broad liberalization would likely not have been possible otherwise.
In the 1970s, China was a closed economy in many ways.
Rent-seeking by government officials was widespread and there
was little indication that the leaders of the economy would want
to disrupt the illiberal status quo. Yet the country provided a
beneficial institutional setting for SEZ-driven reforms.
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The most important feature was the country’s
decentralization, both on the political and fiscal front. After the
death of Mao, the Communist party started focusing on economic
development in the country, as opposed to class struggle.103 The
party leaders in Beijing pursued this through political
decentralization and incentives to local leaders to produce
economic growth. The central government had the power to award
local leaders if they obtained their growth targets, and unseat
them if not.104 Yet policy-making was to a large extent left to the
local levels of government. Fiscal decentralization meant that local
leaders could benefit from higher tax revenues, and hence benefit
in two ways from local growth.105
Fiscal decentralization thus presented these officials with a
trade-off. They could promote protectionism and benefit from
the rent-seeking opportunities that this would provide. The
down side of this approach, however, was suppressed economic
growth, which lowered their tax revenues. By promoting
liberalization in their municipality or province, local leaders
could amass more tax revenues, albeit at the expense of limiting
their rent-seeking opportunities. 106
The extent to which local leaders pursued growth at the
expense of rent-seeking varied, as some areas were better
exploited for rent-seeking and others for tax revenues. Areas close
to trading spots, such as ports with more opportunities to benefit
from trade and foreign investments, would offer more
opportunities of real economic growth and tax revenues. However,
China’s closed system probably made this difficult in most cases.
By contrast, areas close to Beijing would likely benefit more from
central government largesse through rent-seeking schemes. Areas
rich in extractive industries, like mining and other natural
resources, would also incentivize officials to take the rent-seeking
approach, by granting exploitation rights to friends and those
offering favors in return.
The aggregate structure of China’s economy at the time
suggests that rent-seeking in many cases offered the most
lucrative opportunities. In this context, a group of business people
with connections to Hong Kong started lobbying for exemptions
from protectionism, to make it easier for them to conduct business

See Xu, supra note 89, at 1090.
See id. at 1093–94.
See Shaomin Li, Shuhe Li & Weiying Zhang, The Road to Capitalism: Competition
and Institutional Change in China, 28 J. COMP. ECON. 269, 283–84 (2000).
106 See id.
103
104
105
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in the then-British colony.107 They turned to Ye Fei, Minister of
Transport, who ultimately granted them a special deregulated
area from which they could conduct their business from Shekou in
Guangdong Province, adjacent to Hong Kong.108 The Shekou
Industrial zone opened in 1979, as the first SEZ of China.109
Seeing the benefit of the zone, the governor of Guangdong
province started to promote SEZs for China. 110 The first three
zones officially labeled SEZs were thus located in Guangdong. 111
One of them is Shenzhen, which was only a small fishing village
when it was designated an SEZ. 112 Its special status allowed it
to grow into a megacity of over ten million people. With more
SEZs being introduced, more local leaders lobbied for SEZs in
their areas.113
The zones thus spread gradually throughout the country.
1984 was an important year in this development, as China’s fifth
SEZ was introduced in Hainan, together with fourteen other zones
labeled “Coastal Cities.”114 In 1992, all provincial capitals were
designated as SEZs, which meant that over half of all
municipalities in China now hosted SEZs.115
It is important to understand the mechanism through which
the SEZs proliferated. Some previous work on SEZs in China has
described them as test-beds for policy-making. Government
officials could see what worked in the SEZs and then implement
those policies in the country at large.116 This theory sells the SEZs
short, as it suggests that they were not instrumental in
liberalizing China. The leaders had allegedly already made up
107 GEORGE T. CRANE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CHINA’S SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES
26 (1990).
108 Id.
109 Victor F.S. Sit, Specials Economic Zones in China: A New Type of Export Processing
Zone?, 23 THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 69, 75 (1985); CRANE, supra note 107, at 26.
110 See RONALD COASE & NING WANG, HOW CHINA BECAME CAPITALIST 61 (2012).
111 Id.
112 See id. at 59.
113 See id. at 60–62; see also CRANE, supra note 107, at 26–27.
114 CRANE, supra note 107, at 156; KAREN I. MCKENNEY, THE INDUS. COLL. OF THE
ARMED FORCES, AN ASSESSMENT OF CHINA’S SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES 11 (1994).
115 See Wang, supra note 1, at 136; Payton Alexander, Laboratories for Capitalism:
Testing the Limits of the Special Economic Zones of Mainland China 11 (2014) (unpublished
M.A. dissertation, University of Edinburgh).
116 See Kwan-yiu Wong & David K.Y. Chu, Export Processing Zones and Special
Economic Zones as Locomotives of Export-led Economic Growth, in MODERNIZATION IN
CHINA: THE CASE OF THE SHENZHEN SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE 1, 6 (Kwan-yiu Wong & David
K.Y. Chu eds., 1985); CRANE, supra note 107, at 96; Wei Ge, Special Economic Zones and
the Opening of the Chinese Economy: Some Lessons for Economic Liberalization, 27 WORLD
DEV. 1267, 1268, 1281 (1999); Jean-Pierre Cling & Gaëlle Letilly, Export Processing Zones:
A Threatened Instrument for Global Economy Insertion? 7 (Dévelopment et Insertion
Internationale, Working Paper No. DT/2001/17, 2001), http://ideas.repec.org/p/dia/wpaper/
dt200117.html [http://perma.cc/S6TD-4XRL]; Xu, supra note 89, at 1114–15.
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their minds and were only looking for the right policies to promote
growth. While the SEZs were tools in this pursuit, they would
eventually have found the liberalizing reforms beneficial.
In this story, the SEZs were a top-down project, a notion
that fits the common story about Deng Xiaoping making China
an economic powerhouse through his convictions and strong
leadership. In fact, Deng Xiaoping, like most leaders, did not
support the SEZ policy until the mid-1980s, when they started
to prove their worth. 117 SEZs can give policy makers an idea
about the effect of certain policies, but as test-beds for reform,
they cannot reconstruct a system built on rent-seeking into one
of openness.
Another often-told story about SEZs is that they function as
showcases for reform.118 In the case of China, Communist Party
leaders would have introduced the zones to show either other
policy makers or the public that liberalization could create wealth.
However, this too is a story about policy makers seeking ways to
maximize the wellbeing of the citizenry. If this were indeed their
goal, they would eventually understand what kind of reforms to
introduce in this pursuit. As with SEZs as test-beds for reform,
SEZs as showcases can benefit the country only at the margin by
speeding up a process toward liberalization that is set to occur in
any case.
The power of SEZs is instead that they can change the
incentives of policy makers from relying on rent-seeking to
promoting growth, and this is what seems to have happened in
China. The new SEZs gave the country an image of newfound
openness. China was, in practice, becoming capitalist.119 Local
leaders thus saw two main changes that affected their incentives.
For one, it became possible to reap the rewards of economic growth
through openness. Second, it became harder to rent-seek, as
businesses within the country had the opportunity to move to
SEZs with more open business environments. The trade-off
between rent-seeking and taxation thus tilted in the favor of the
latter for more local leaders. As they lobbied for and obtained their
SEZs, they made rent-seeking a decreasingly attractive strategy
for other local leaders.
Eventually, a majority of the ruling elite in China could
benefit more from openness and liberalization than protectionism
See CRANE, supra note 107, at 156.
See George T. Crane, ‘Special Things in Special Ways’: National Economic Identity
and China’s Special Economic Zones, 32 AUSTL. J. CHINESE AFF. 71, 76; see also COASE &
WANG, supra note 110, at 160.
119 See COASE & WANG, supra note 110, at 164–66.
117
118
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and rent-seeking. At that point, China truly had relieved itself
from its previous destructive status quo. By 2008, ninety-two
percent of all Chinese municipalities hosted SEZs.120 China still
suffers from corrupt practices throughout their official
institutions, but no more so than the United States did at a similar
stage of development.121
In addition to opening up the country to the world, the SEZs
in China have avoided many of the problems that plagued the
Indian zones. For one, political decentralization meant that
decisions about the zones were taken on the local level by people
who were familiar with prevailing business conditions. As a result,
fewer mistakes were made regarding zone location and nature of
production. Also, Chinese policy makers had little reason to use
the zones for rent-seeking. They owe their seats to the elites in
Beijing, who reward them for high GDP growth and can demote
them if they fail to reach the growth targets.122 If granted an SEZ,
they have the opportunity to secure their jobs and advance their
careers by boosting economic growth. In many cases, the rewards
that come from the top are larger than the rents they may extract
by trading SEZ privileges. Similar to a democracy, China’s system
incentivizes local leaders to promote economic prosperity, as this
rewards them politically.
China shows that SEZs can help profoundly change a country
stuck in a rent-seeking disequilibrium. Still, it does not provide an
example for how “governments” can use SEZs to promote growth.
Had China’s ruling elite wanted to reform the country, they could
have done so much faster than through SEZs. The zones served
instead as tools from the people at the bottom of the hierarchy to
promote changes that initially were against the interest of the
majority of rulers.
There may be no other policy that can promote such change
so forcefully. For this to happen, though, conditions must be
right, with sufficient decentralization and heterogeneity
between municipalities, so that some can lead the SEZ reform
while others follow. Alas, while it happened in China, it is
unclear whether other countries will see a similar SEZ-led
restructuring in the future.

Wang, supra note 1, at 136.
See Carlos D. Ramirez, Is Corruption in China “out of control”? A Comparison with
the US in Historical Perspective, 42 J. COMP. ECON. 76, 77–78 (2014).
122 See Xu, supra note 89, at 1093, 1102.
120
121
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V. IMPLICATIONS FOR SEZS IN THE UNITED STATES
A thorough understanding of the political economy of SEZs
allows for an analysis of the benefits and flaws of the SEZs of
the United States. Labeled “foreign trade zones,” these were
introduced in 1934 as a response to the Smoot-Hawley Tariff
Act that came about as a reaction to the Great Depression. 123
Today, there are around 750 zones, which offer investors tariff
and tax exemptions. 124
These fiscal incentives allow zone companies to be more
profitable by reducing the cost of doing business and encouraging
regional commerce.125 To the extent that taxes and tariffs
discourage the productive use of resources, SEZs in the United
States create wealth by offsetting them. However, the zones are
not without their critics, who primarily seem to focus on the
limited impact the zones have on the economy as a whole.
Tiefenbrun, for instance, points out that exports from the zones
are only 2.6% of the total126 (this figure was closer to 2.7% by
August 2017).127 Therefore, she concludes that the zones have done
little to promote U.S. exports.128
As was previously discussed, this is a flawed metric by which
to judge SEZ success, as it tells us nothing about their net
impact.129 The U.S. zones may be small, but as long as their costs
are smaller than their benefits, they still constitute a good policy
for the country. However, as will be argued here, the United States
relies far too much on small zones, and would be better off with
larger, more diversified SEZs that include residential
developments and offer investors more regulatory incentives.
There are some arguments for SEZ success in the United
States. To start, the SEZs are largely decentralized. The federal
government does not develop the zones, but leaves this to zone
applicants. An applicant must be a “public or public-type
corporation.”130 Zone development is thus open to private
development, although there is likely much governmental influence
through public companies. Because these are local, they likely have
an adequate understanding of the business climate in which the

Eichengreen, supra note 91, at 37.
See How many zones exist now?, supra note 11.
See Bell, supra note 11, at 974; see also Tiefenbrun, supra note 12, at 221.
Tiefenbrun, supra note 12, at 214.
See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau & U.S. Bureau of Econ. Analysis, U.S.
International Trade in Goods and Services (Oct. 5, 2017 8:30 AM), https://www.census.gov/
foreign-trade/Press-Release/2017pr/08/ft900.pdf [http://perma.cc/DN2C-ESZB].
128 Id.
129 See MOBERG, supra note 13 and accompanying text.
130 Who can apply?, supra note 28.
123
124
125
126
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zones are introduced. Local policy makers should also be
incentivized to pursue successful zones, as they must answer to
the judgment of their voters of their economic policy-making.
Public companies, on the other hand, do not face such
incentives, as their positions are more akin to bureaucrats who are
not exposed to the democratic process. Thus, the decentralization
of U.S. SEZs go only halfway in solving the knowledge and
incentive problems associated with centralization. Moreover, if
public companies fail in their SEZ project, they will sometimes do
so at the expense of the local government and hence, its tax payers.
While the public involvement in SEZ development is a
concern, the main problem with U.S. SEZs lies in the incentives
they create for the actors involved. The country has unfortunately
relied to a large extent on single-factory zones for the expansion of
its zone scheme. SEZ developers can apply to expand their benefits
to affiliated “subzones,” which are single companies that need not
be located adjacent to the main zone. There are twice as many of
such “subzones” than the 250 “general-purpose zones.”131
The subzones are predominantly focused on manufacturing,
and thus are likely private in most cases.132 The problem, though,
is that such a scheme looks much like a program of targeted fiscal
benefits for companies. In this respect, the United States looks
much like India, with its numerous single-factory zones. This
set-up contrasts sharply with China’s diverse SEZs with millions
of residents. Single-factory zones incentivize companies to lobby
for SEZ designation. They also prompt policy makers to make
the scheme flexible enough that such lobbying is attractive. As
a result, public resources are spent on a politically driven
process of companies seeking benefits and officials responding
to their demands.
Initially, only ports could become SEZs, which would at least
have limited lobbying to that sector. In 1950, as manufacturing
was allowed in the zones, the opportunities they provided became
available to a much larger part of the U.S. economy.133 With the
introduction of single-factory zones in 1954, the field was ripe for
widespread lobbying, as firms no longer had to relocate to obtain
the benefits.134 Although these zones must be affiliated with

131 How many zones exist now?, supra note 11; see also Where can a Zone be Located?, U.S.
FOREIGN-TRADE ZONES BOARD, https://enforcement.trade.gov/ftzpage/info/adjacency.html
[http://perma.cc/7MQ7-SAEC] (last visited Nov. 12, 2017).
132 Who can apply?, supra note 28.
133 Grant, supra note 11, at 8, 10.
134 Id. at 10.
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general-purpose zones, they can potentially be located anywhere.135
Most SEZ-based manufacturing now takes place in subzones,
while general-purpose zones engage primarily in distribution
and wholesaling. 136
Grant finds a significant lobbying activity surrounding the
SEZs.137 “Industry groups, individual producers, local and state
governments, unions, congressmen and senators, and individual
SEZ governing bodies all lobby.”138 The board that approves SEZ
applications often cites the lobbyists’ arguments for its decisions.139
When a government offers fiscal benefits to single companies, such
lobbying should be expected. The single-factory component of the
SEZ scheme is therefore primarily a net waste of resources to the
economy at large. Lower tariffs and taxes across the board for
the county’s manufacturers would clearly be more beneficial.
Thus, the zones are hardly better than such a political
alternative. Yet, even compared to the status quo, the fact that
the system relies on lobbying suggests that the costs of the
scheme outweigh its benefits.
The general-purpose zones, too, are hardly better than an
alternative policy of lowering tariffs and taxes in a less
discriminatory fashion. Still, these look more like traditional
zones, and thanks to the decentralized system, they may well
bring prosperity to the country. While ports also must lobby to
become SEZs, the benefits brought about in applying the fiscal
incentives over a larger area and for more companies can
override the negatives. Whether the benefits of general-purpose
zones outweigh the costs of the single-factory zones is
nevertheless questionable.
For SEZs to benefit the United States, they must be made
larger, more inclusive, and dominated by private developers. The
smaller the zones, the larger the incentive problems become.
Larger and more inclusive zones can also have dynamic effects
that spread prosperity beyond the zone borders. Rather than small
industrial parks, the United States should allow for larger areas
with residential developments that can offer not only fiscal but
also regulatory exemptions. Regulatory incentives not only cost
less for the government to provide but also open up new
opportunities for businesses, as opposed to merely lowering
their expenses.

135
136
137
138
139

See Where can a Zone be Located?, supra note 131.
Grant, supra note 11, at 10.
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Id. at 10.
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The SEZ scheme in the United States came about as a
response to heightened tariffs. In that light, there are three main
roads that the United States can take. First, the government can
reduce the fiscal burden from which companies seeking SEZ status
are trying to alleviate themselves. A reversal of a mistake that
caused the problem in the first place seems logical. Alas, although
tariffs are not as high now as in the 1930s, recent administrations
have not done much to lower them further. Second, the
government can maintain the current SEZ system, which most
likely will remain a burden for the economy. Third, the
government can reform the SEZ scheme to make it more likely
to succeed in enhancing welfare. Seeing that the program is
unlikely to ever be abolished, the last option has the best chance
of coming about.
CONCLUSION
There is reason to be optimistic about the future of SEZs.
Decades of experience have shown which models promote
prosperity and which come with too many burdensome costs.
However, to understand what makes a successful SEZ, one needs
a political economy perspective, which accounts for institutional
contexts and recognizes the problems caused by limited knowledge
and distorted incentives of the policy makers involved. Experience
and logic show that an SEZ is a potent tool, which can do much
good and much harm, depending on how it is used. With an
increased appreciation of the political economy perspective of
SEZs, more zone practitioners may promote the kinds of zone
models that most likely promote welfare in any given
institutional context.
The United States can also hope to learn from the rich
experiences of the SEZs of the past. So far, the U.S. zones have
hardly benefited the country, but that does not mean that they
might not do so in the future. With large, privately developed
zones, the United States can establish an SEZ policy that not only
is better than the status quo, but also even better than its political
alternative. In the best case, the U.S. zones may even promote
countrywide reforms.
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